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RECOGNITION BY INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION COMMISSIONS
In a number of cases international arbitration commissions have
recognized the principle of election. In the case of Gautier v. Mexico,
which was submitted to arbitration under the Convention of July 4,
I868, an award was made in the claimant's favor. Gautier was born
in the United States of French parents and went to Mexico to reside
at the age of nineteen. He was said to have made a "valid act of adop-
"tion of French nationality," and was recognized by the Arbitration
Commission as a French citizen.50
The claims of the de Hammers and de Boissots against Venezuela
related to persons who were born in Venezuela of American fathers.
Andrade, Commissioner, in rendering his decision said:
"Having attained their majority they have not claimed the paternal
citizenship, nor have they fixed their domicil in the United -States..
This conjuncture of circumstances seems to clearly indicate that they,
too, have renounced the citizenship-of their filiation and chosen that of
their birthplace and permanent domicil. . . . In case of conflict
between several citizenships that is to be preferred which is more7 in
accordance with the actual position of the person, namely that of the
place of his actual residence and domicil."
In this case Little, Commissioner, observed that questions of dual
nationality must be "resolved from the-standpoint of the public law,"
meaning, presumably, international law."-
The decisions just mentioned do not seem to accord entirely with the
decision of the American and British Claims Commission in the case of
Alexander v. United States. Alexander was born in Kentucky in 1819,
the son of a Scotchman, went to Scotland in early youth, resided there
for many years and after reaching his majority held office in Scotland,
but subsequently returned to Kentucky, where he died in 1867. It was
held that his claim against the United States should be dismissed, as he
haa never lost his American citizenship. "He was not capable of
"divesting himself of his American nationality by mere volition and
"residence from time to time in Scotland and holding office there."52
In other words, the Arbitration Commission in this case took the
strictly legal view of citizenship, and, finding no statute of the United
States under which an American loses his citizenship by making a
practical election of a foreign nationality, held that he was still an
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American citizen. Possibly a different decision would have been made,if Alexander had not returned to the United States to reside, but this
is not likely.
In most of the cases involving questions of dual nationality decided
by international courts of arbitration the claimants were found to be
citizens of the countries against which the claims were brought, under
their laws, although they were also citizens of other countries under
the laws thereof, and in nearly all of these cases it was held that the
courts had no jurisdiction, since a person cannot properly sue in such a
court a country of which he is a citizen. In the case of Mathison v.
Venezuela" it appeared that the claimant was born in Venezuela Sep-
tember 14, 1858, of a British father and had always resided there.
Plumley, the Umpire, said:
"It is admitted that, if he is also a Venezuelan by the laws of.Venezuela,
then the law of the ad6micile prevails and the claimant has no placebefore this Mixed Commission."
The Umpire decided that he was in fact a Venezuelan citizen, under
Venezuelan law, and therefore disallowed the claim. It seems likely
that, if he had been domiciled in Great Britain, the decision would"
have been the same, for. under Venezuelan law, he would still have been
a citizen of Venezuela. In this case the Umpire went so far as to say
that Mathison was "not a British subject," but this was merely a dictum,
the decision that he was a Venezuelan being a stifficient ground for dis-
allowing the claim. The Umpire's statement that Mathison was not a
British subject seems to have been based upon his theory that jus soli
is. the only true principle of nationality.
The case of Oscar Chopin v. United States related to a persoi who
was born in the United States of a native French father. Apparently
he had cbntinued to reside in this country. The Commission under the
Convention between the United States and France of January 1$ i8o,for some unaccountable reason, decided the case in his favor, although
he was not only a citizen of the United States under the law of this
country, but apparently domiciled in the United States. The report
of the case is meagre54 and the grounds for the decision are not given,
but it seems to -have been contrary to all precedents and cannot, be
regarded as of much weight.
In a number of cases the Venezuelan Arbitration Commissions
decided adversely the claims of Venezuelan women who were widows
of aliens and had always been domiciled in their native land.5 Although
'in these cases the Arbitration Commissions laid some stress upon thefact that the women in question were domiciled in Venezuela, their
decisions found sufficient basis in the simple fact that, under Venezuelan
Ralston, Venezuela Arbitrations of z9o3 (i9o4) 429.
"Boutwell, Report (i88o) 88;. 3 Moore, International Arbitrations, 25o6.
Stevenson, Miliani, Brignone, and Poggioli Cases, Ralston, op. cit, 438, 771o, and 847; Hammer & Brissot Case, Moore, International Arbitrations, 2456.
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law, they had recovered Venezuelan nationality upon the deaths of their
husbands. While these latter cases have been sometimes cited in dis-
cussions of dual nationality and election, they would seem to have only
an indirect bearing upon the question which we have under consider-
ation.
Altogether, While arbitration courts have tQ some extent recognized
the principle of election, they can hardly be said by their decisions to
have established it as a definite rule of international law.
Perhaps the most notable decision of a court of arbitration, in which
the question of dual nationality has been involved, was the decision of
ihe Hague court, May 3, 1917, in the Canevaro arbitration. The claim
against Peru of Raffaele Canevaro, who was born in Peru of an Italian
father, and had resided and carried on business there during the greater
part of his life, was disallowed because he had the status of a Peruvian
citizen under Peruvian law. The decision of the court was based upon
the following postulates, among others:
"And whereas, according to Peruvian legislation (Art. 34 of the
Constitution), Rapheal Canevaro is a Peruvian by birth because borni on
Peruvian territory,
"And, on the other hand, the Italian legislation (Art. 4 of the Civil
Code) assigns to him Italian nationality because he was born of an
Italian father;
"And whereas, as a matter of fact, Rapheal Canevaro has on several
occasions acted as a Peruvian citizen, both by running as a candidate
for the Senate, where none are admitted except Peruvian citizens and
where he Went to defend his election, and also especially by accepting
the office of Consul General of the Netherlands, after soliciting the
authorization of the Peruvian Government and then of the Peruvian
Congress;
"And whereas, under these circumstances, whatever Rapheal Cane
varo's status may be in Italy with respect to his nationality, the Govern-
ment of Peru has a right to consider him as a Peruvian citizen and to
deny his status as an Italian claimant." 58
Charles de Boeck speaks in high praise of this decision. "In our
"opinion," he says,
,"one cannot but approve this manner, at once elegant and practical
(realiste) of re'solving a question which, theoretically, would seem
insoluble. The 'elegantia juris' is satisfied, for neither of the two
sovereignties, equally to be respected, which are found in conflict is
sacrificed. From the point of view of concrete reality, how can we
be surprised to see preferred the active nationality, that which is of law
and of fact, and for which the manifest and constant will of the person
in interest has been pronounced." 57
While this important decision seems to have a decided slant toward
recognition of the principle of election, it is to be noted that the court
did not go so far as to hold that Raffaele Canevaro had ceased to be an
Italian subject. The decision went no further than to decide that he had
(1912) 6 AMzF.. JOuR. INT. LAw, 747.
0913) 2o REVUE GENALE DR DROIT INTERNAT ORAL P3ULC, 349.
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continued to be a citizen of Peru, and, therefore, according to the
generally recognized rule, could not recover from Peru as a subject of
Italy.
VIEWS OF WRITERS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
Having considered the recognition of the principle of election of
nationality by Secretaries of State and by Arbitration Commissions, let
us now consider to what extent, if at all, it has been recognized as a
part of international law by authorities on that subject, and as a part
of the municipal law of the United States by the courts of this country.
It is a well recognized principle that each country must decide for
itself what persons are to have its nationality. "It is not for Interna-
"tional but for Municipal Law," says Oppenheim, "to determine who is
"and who is not to be considered a subject." ' "Each individual State,"
says Bar, "will always, in the first place, have to decide whether, ,in
"accordance with its own legal system, any particular person is to be
"recognized as belonging to it or not." 59  He qualifies the rule some-
what by the words, "in the first place." Wharton's statement is some-
what more explicit. "Questions as to citizenship," he says, "are deter-
"mined by municipal law in subordination to the law of nations."8 0
It remained for Hall to explain how, and to what extent, municipal law
is subordinated to international law in the decision of questions of
nationality. He says that international law
"declares that the quality of a subject must not be imposed upon certain
persons with regard to whose position as members of another sovereign
community it is considered that there is no room for the existence of
doubt, the imposition of that quality upon an acknowledged foreigner
being evidently inconsistent with a due recognition of the independence
of the state to which he belongs; but where a difference of legal theory
can exist international law-has made no choice, and it is left open to
states to act as they like."
He adds:
"The persons as to whose nationality no room for difference of opinion
exists are in the main those who have been born within a state territory
of parents belonging to the community, and whose connexion with their
state has not been severed through any act done by it or by them-
selves...
"The persons as to whose nationality a difference of legal theory is
possible are children born of the subjects of one power within the
territory of another. '61
In otfier words, according to Hall, it is left to each state to act as it
likes with regard to persons born in its territory of alien parents or
i International Law (2d ed. 1912) sec. 293.
"Bar, Private International Law (2d ed. 1892).
02 Wharton, International Law Digest (1886) 324.
Hall, International Law (5th ed. i9o4) 24-225. The principle thAt municipal
laws of nationality are limited by international law is found in the generally
recognized rule that no country can claim as its nationals children born in its
territories of foreign diplomatic officers. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark
(898) 169 U. S. 649, 674, i8 Sup. Ct. 456, 466.
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abroad of its nationals. Hall might well have qualified his statement
that it is left to each state to act as it likes by adding the words, "pro'-
"vided it is in a position to do so," although he was doubtless referring
to the bare legal claim to allegiance rather than the .actual enforcement
thereof. Hall fails to suggest that claims to the nationality of persons,
arising out of the conflicting theories of jus soli and jus sanguinis, may
be settled by election. -In fact he does not seem to recognize election
as a rule of international law. The same may be said of Westlake,
although, in the tenth chapter of his admirable book on International
1._w he discusses questions of nationality with particular care. The
only solution which he suggests is that
"no state shall extend its protection to. its nationals residing in the
territory of another state which claims them as its own nationals by any
title known in the 'civilized world, whether jus soli, jus sanguinis or
naturalization."
In other words, the claim of the state which has the person within- its
jurisdiction prevails. If works of well known authors uporl the subject
are the principal guide for determining what is international law, there
seems to be some doubt as to the accuracy of the statement of Secretary
Bayard in the case of Victor Labroue 62 that "the law of nations," as
well as the French law, required him, upon reaching his majority "to
"make his election" of the nationality which he wished to preserve.
HAS ELECTION BEEN R1ECOGNIZED BY COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES?
In several cases the courts of this country have made mention 'of the
principle of election in cases of dual nationality, but whether their
pronouncements in regard thereto amounted to legal decisions or merely
to dicta is another question.
The principle of election was mentioned by Justice Thompson in
rendering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
year 183o. in the case of Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor.63
It appeared that Inglis was born in New York, probably less than a year
before September 15, 1776, of a native Irish father, and that he was
taken by the latter to England in the year 1783 and two or three years
later to Nova Scotia, where they continued to. reside. Justice Thomp"
son said that, if Inglis was born before JOly 4, 1776, when the United
States became independent, or after September 15, 1776, when the
British military forces took possession of New York, he was a British
subject by birth and not an American citizen, but if he was born after
July 4, 1776, and before September 15, 1776, he was born with dual
nationality, and that
"his infancy incapacitated him from making any election for himself,
and his election and character followed that of his father, subject to
the right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of
his minority; which never having been done, he remains a British
subject, and disabled from inheriting the land in question" (p. 126).
6' 3 Moore, 546. (i83o, U. S.) 3 Pet. 99.
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In Lynch v. Clarke6" Assistant Vice Chancellor Sandford alluded to
the rule of election. He observed that application in the United States
of the principle of law that the political condition of the child follows
that of the father would lead to "the perpetuation'of a race of aliens."
"Accordingly," he added,
"the difficulty is sought to be obviated by giving to the child born of
alien parents, the election, on arriving at maturity, to become a citizen
either of the state where he was born, or of the state of vhich his
father was a member" (p: 673).
However, the learned judge proceeded to argue that recognition of the
right of election involved a general recognition of the right to change
one's nationality at will, that is, the right of expatriation, and this
right he seemed unwilling to concede.
The decision in L-udlam v. Ludlam6" has been cited as upholding the
doctrine of election. Maximo Ludlam was born in Lima, Peru, in 1831
and came to the United States in 1836, with his father, a native Ameri-
can who had gone to Peru in 1822. Although born before'the passage
of the Act of 1855, and although the Act of I8O2 had been held to be not
prospective, the court held that Maximo Ludlam was born a citizen
of the United States under the common law. and had done nothing to
divest himself of his American citizenship. The court seems to have
considered the Act of 25 Edward III as merely declaratory of the
common law. After mentioning possible difficulties arising under dual
nationality, Judge Selden said:
"No such difficulty would be likely to arise during his minority, andon
his arriving at maturity he would have the right to elect one allegiance
and repudiate the other, and such election would be. conclusive upon
him, and would doubtless be respected by the.governments" (P. 377).
Although this statement seems clear and unequivocal it can hardly be
deemed a decision of the court.
Again the principle of election was recognized in the case of State v.
Jackson,66 decided in 19o7 by the Supreme Court of Vermont. It
appeared that Samuel Nelson Jackson was born in Canada, his father,
Horatio Nelson Jackson, having been born in the United States. 'The
court said:
"The citizenship acquired by Samuel Nelson Jackson at birth was a
qualified one, and of that peculiar character under the law which
required an election on his part upon attaining his majority or within
a reasonable time thereafter whether he would conserve the citi.enship
of the United States or that of Canada. This election when once made
is binding.upon him and the count'y of his choice. Ludlam v. Ludlam,
26 N. Y. at p. 371, 84 Am. Dec. 193; Van Dyne on Cit. 38. Such an
election Samuel Nelson seasonably made, for he came to this country
a minor, completed his education here, resided here several years after
attaining, his majority, took the freeman's oath, engaged in business,
(z844, N. Y. Ch.) i Sandf. 583.
(1863) 26 N. Y. 356.
"(1907) 79 Vt 504, 65 Aft. 657.
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paid taxes, and intended to become and thereby did become an Ameri-
can citizen in the full and unqualified sense of the term."
The court went on to say:
"His son, S. Holister, the respondent, was born in Canada in 1875, born
into that same kind of American citizenship which required an election
on his part as it.heid of his father. He came to Vermont permanently
to reside in 1895, a minor, and upon arriving at-full age made a complete
election of American citizenship by taking the oaths required by law,
securing his enrollment as a voter in Barre, and by exercising and
enjoying all the rights and performing all the duties of citizenship from
that time until his election as state's attorney for Washington County,
an office which he was, by law, duly qualified to accept and fill."
This is the most unequivocal pronouncement in favor of election of
citizenship that I have been able to find in any court decision except,
perhaps, the statement of Justice Thompson in Inglis v. Trustees of
Sailor's Snug Harbor, but it is not clear what the judge meant by "the
"oaths required by law." He could not have referred to the oaths
required by the sixth section of the Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907,
because the decision was rendered more than a month prior to the
passage of that Act.
Iri Ex parte Chin King,6" decided in 1888, it appeared that Chin
King and Chin San Hea were born in this country October Io, I868,
and March- 15, 1878, respectively, and were sent by their father to
China in 188i. It was argued that their father had sent them to China
for permanent residence, and that they had thereby lost their claim to
American citizenship which they had ,acquired by birth in the United
States. The court said:
"But it seems that the citizenship of the petitioners would not be
affected by the fact, if they had never come back, unless it also appears
that they had in some formal and affirmative way renounced the same.
"However, in my judgment, a father cannot deprive his minor child
of the status of American citizenship, impressed upon it by the circum-
stances of its birth under the constitution and within the jurisdiction
of the United States. This status, once acquired, can only be lost or
changed by the act of the party when arrived at majority, and the
consent of the government" (p. 356).
The decision just mentioned has no very important bearing upon the
question of election, since the persons concerned had not reached the
age of election. So far as the judge's opinion referred to the principle
of election it was a mere dictum.
The cases of Trimbles v. Harrison6' and Calais v. Marshfield" cited
in the Report of the Citizenship Board of I9O6,70 have a very indirect
bearing, ifiany, upon the subject under discussion, since they both relate
to persons who were born in what is now the United States, before the
Declaration of Independence, were residing in this country at the time
(I888, C. C. D. Ore.) 35 Fed. 354. "(i84o, Ky.) i B. Mon. 140.
(1849) 30 Me. 51i.
(H. R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess.) 74, 75.
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of the Declaration, but afterwards removed to British territory to
reside. It is unnecessary to discuss these cases in detail, but the ques-
tion was whether their citizenship had been transferred to the United
States by the transfer of sovereignty over the territory. There is a
clear distinction between such cases and cases of persons born with dual
nationality.
The decision in the case of State v. Adams71 mentioned in the
Citizenship Board Report as containing "one of the clearest statements
"of recognition"7 2 of the principle of election, was evidently miscon-'
strued. In this case the defendant's grandfather was born in Connecti-
cut in 1764 and emigrated to Canada in 179o, his father was born in
Canada in 1795 and he himself was born there in 1834. In the year of
his birth the defendant was brought by his father to the United States
to reside. His father had served in the Canadian militia involuntarily
in the War of 1812 and in the year 1875 had received from the Cana-
dian Government a bounty of $20 for his services. The court held that
defendant's father was born a citizen of the United States under the
Act of 18o2, and that he himself was also born a citizen of this country,
although it was not stated under what law he claimed citizenship.73
The gist of the decision was that the father had not, by his prolonged
residence in Canada after attaining his majority and service in the
Canadian army, lost his American citizenship. The only reference in
the decision to the right of election related to the defendant's grand-
father, who was said to have had a right to elect British or United States
citizenship during the period between 1776 and 1783, the date of the
Treaty of Peace with Great Britain. The statement of the judge
quoted in the Citizenship Board Report that "the plaintiff,74 at the time
"of his election, was a citizen of the United States" was misunderstood.
The judge was referring, not to election of citizenship, but to the defen-
dant's election as mayor of a town in Iowa, the legality of which had
been questioned upon the ground that he was an alien. 5 Although the
court did not enter into a discussion of election in cases of dual nation-
ality, it decided in effect that, in the case of a person born in a foreign
country of an American father, election of the nationality of the
country of birth and loss of American nationality are not to be inferred
from continued residence in- the country of birth. A similar decision
was made in the case of Ware v. Wisner,7 6.whieh also related-to persons.
born in Canada of American parents. In this case both father and sons
had engaged in business in Canada and voted in local elections, but it
was held that they had not thereby lost their American citizenship.
(1876) 45 Iowa, 99. Supra, at p. 79.
,' The court apparently overlooked the fact that the Act of 18o2 was not pros-
pective.
"This was a slip; he meant the defendant.
"This is one of the few errors in this carefully prepared and most valuable
report.
," (1883, C. C. D. Iowa) 5o Fed. 31O.
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It is obvious from the above discussion, that the right of election in
cases of dual nationality cannot be said to have been established as a
part of the municipal law by the decisions of the courts of this country.
The nearest approach to an actual decision in support of the right of
election is the decision in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor,
but, as in that case it was not clear that Inglis had been born a citizen
of the United States, the decision cannot be said to have established the
right of election as a part of the citizenship law of the United States.
When judges have in their opinions expressly mentioned the principle
of election, their observations have for the most part been in the nature
of dicta. Thus, in State v. Jackson it was not essential to the" decision
reached to introduce the discussion of the principle of election, for, if
there had been no such thing as election, the decision would no doubt
have been the same. On the other hand, if the court had held that
Jackson had made an effective election of Canadian citizenship and had
thereby lost his American citizenship, the decision could clearly be cited
as upholding the principle of election. It is difficult to see how any
decision of a court of this country can be deemed to support the theory
of election as a part of the law unless it is held that the person concerned
has by electing a foreign nationality lost American citizenship. It
remains true that th"e observations of judges in which they recognize
the principle are worthy of respect, although they have not the effect of
legal decisions. 7
7
THE ACT OF MARCH 2, 1907
We have seen above that many foreign countries have made statutory
provisions of one kind or another for election in cases of dual nation-
ality. In this respect our own country has been one of the most back-
7' Since writing the above, I have had my attention called to the case of
Ex Part Gilroy (February 29, i919, S. D. N. Y.) 257 Fed. Iio. The question
presented was whether one Walter Alexander came within the category of
"natives,. ctizens, subjects or denizens" of an enemy country, under sec. 4o67
U. S. Rev. St., as amended by an' Act of April i6, 1918. It appeared that Alexan-
der was born in Germany, October 23, i893, of a naturalized American father,
and resided in Germany until November, 1915, when he came to the United States,
with a passport issued by the American Embassy at Berlin. From September,
1914, until about January I, 1915, he had served voluntarily in the "Imperial
Volunteer Motor Corps," but there. was no evidence that he had ever taken an
oath of allegiance to the German Emperor. When he left Germany, the Ger-
man authorities recognized his American passport as valid. Judge Mayer, in
delivering the, opinion of the court, said that, among other questions, it was
necessary to defermine "whether, because of the doctrine of so-called double
allegiance, relator so acted, after attaining majority, as to select Germany, instead
of the United States, as the country of his allegiance." After quoting Professor
Moore's statement in 3 International Law Digest, 518, concerning "double alle-
giance," Judge Mayer said:
"When Alexander became 21 years of age, he lived in Germany, and therefore,
if Moore is right, his allegiance to Germany, because of his German birth, would
be determined by the German law. It is entirely plain that the German authori-
ties did not regard him as a German citizen, but, if anything, as a man without
nationality. It is by no means clear that a person must affirmatively select his
YALE LAW JOURNAL
ward. The only attempt on the part of the United ,States to providea statutory solution is found in the Act of Congress of March 2, "1907,commonly known as the Citizenship Act. The first paragraph of sec-
tion 2 of the Act provides:
"That any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated him-self when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformitywith its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign
state."
The 6th section of the Act provides as follows:
"That all children born outside the limits of the United States whoare citizens thereof in accordance with the provisions of sectior nine-teen hundred and ninety-three of the Revised Statutes of the UnitedStates and who continue to reside outside the United States, shall, inorder to receive the protection of this Government, be required uponreaching the age of eighteen years to record at an American consulatetheir intention to become residents and remain citizens of the UnitedStates and shall be further required to take the oath of allegiance tothe United States upon attaining their majority."
If a person born a citizen of the United States under the law of thiscountry and, at the same time, a citizen of another country under itslaw, upon reaching majority takes an oath of allegiance to the othercountry, it is clear that he thereby loses his American citizenship, but,to reach this conclusion it is not necessary to rely upon the principleof election. Moreover, it is not believed that the law of any foreigncountry except Greece requires the taking of the oath of allegiance
as a part of the formality of signifying election.It has been suggested that the formal election of foreign nationalityis equivalent to naturalization in the foreign country, so that the personmaking the election thereby loses his American citizenship under sec-tion 2 of the Act. However, this is not believed to be the case, sincenaturalization involves the acquisition of a new nationality not pre-viously enjoyed, whereas election of foreign nationality merely confirms
an existing status so far as the foreign country is concerned.Section 6 of the Act is a step in the direction of a real provision forelection of nationality, but only a step. It falls far short of a satisfac-tory provision. In the first place, it relates only to persons who- areborn abroad to American citizens and who continue to reside abroad;
allegiance when he becomes of age. In questions which might arise as to prop-erty, the inquiry would doubtless be as to the conduct of a person after he becameof age, and that inquiry might cover a considerable period. So, in the case atbar, where the question might arise as to which country could claim him as asubject, unless Alexander did somethiig which indicated allegiance to Germany,between October 23, 1914, and November'8, 1915, when he swore to his appli-cation for a passport, and took the oath of, allegiance to the United States, heneither lost his American citizenship nor elected German citizenship. Duringthat period there is only one act which Alexander might have done which wouldhave amounted to a renunciation of American citizenship and allegiance to theImperial German government, and that was, if an oath of allegiance, contraryto his testimony, was required of him in connection with his service in the vol-unteer motor corps."
As Alexander was not considered a German subject under German law, judgeMayer's observations concerning election were in the nature of a dictum.
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in the second place, it says nothing about renunciation of the foreign
allegiance; and in the third place its express object is merely to enable
the person concerned "to receive the protection of this Government."
'
"
Furthermore, it is unfortunately vague as to the period within which
the preliminary declaration of intention must be made, as well as the
period within which the oath of allegiance must be taken. It has been
held by the Department of State that the words, "upon reaching the
"age of eighteen years," mean within a reasonable time, not necessarily
within one year, after reaching the age named. The same rule would
seem to be applicable to the provision in regard to taking the oath of
allegiance. The reason for requiring the declaration in question to be
made, by a person born abroad of American parents, "upon reaching
"the age of eighteen years" seems to have been that liability for military
service in most foreign countries accrues at about that age, and it was
thought desirable to require those who should seek to avoid such ser-
vice because of their American parentage to make an express declara-
tion of intention to retain their American citizenship. Because of its
vagueness and the fact that comparatively few Americans of foreign
birth take advantage of it, the provision in question has not been as
effective as might be desired.
THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY HAVING JURISDICTION PREVAILS
No discussion of this subject can be complete without a reference to
the generally recognized rule that where two countries claim the alle-
giance of an individual the law of thb country within whose jurisdic-
tion he is to be found at a given time must necessarily prevail. In ari
opinion of June 12, 1869, which has been often quoted, Attorney
General Hoar said:
"If therefore by the laws of the country of their birth children of
American citizens, born in that country, are subjects of its government,
I do not think that it is competent to the United States by any legislation
to interfere with that relation, or, by undertaking to extend to them the
rights of citizens of this country, to interfere with the allegiance which
they may owe to the country of their birth while they continue within
its territory, or to change the relation to other foreign nations which,
by reason of their place of birth, may at any time exist."
7 9
In 1873 President Grant called upon .the members of his cabinet for
opinions upon several difficult problems of citizenship, and the reply
of Secretary of State Fish contained a statement very similar to the
opinion of Attorney General Hoar just quoted. The opinion was
quoted aknost verbatim in the Consular Regulations of I870,8 and a
special qualified form of passport was provided for the use of persons
born abroad of American fathers. This form contained a statement
"Failure to register or to take the oath of allegiance, or both, does not result
in a loss of American citizenship. Ex part Gilroy, supra, at pp. 125, 126.
13 Op. Atty. Gen. 89-91. See also 3 Moore, 533 ff.
Par. i73.
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that the right of the bearer to the protection of the United States was
"limited and qualified by the obligations and duties which attach to him(or her) under the laws of the 1(ingdom (Empire or Republic)of , in which he (or she) was born (his [or her] father beingthen a citizen of the United States), and, where he (or she) now
resides."""
This qualified form of passport seems to have been abandoned in 1885.Indeed, there is apparently no more reason for using a qualifiedform in case of a person born abroad of an American fatherthan there is for using it in case of a person born in the UnitedStates of an alien father, for this country, following the dic-tate of common sense, has -recognized its inability to make its claims tothe allegiance of such a person prevail over the claims of the country
of the father's nationality, when the person concerned is actually withinits jurisdiction. Thus, in an instruction of May 3, 1892, SecretaryBlaine, after authorizing the American Minister in Berlin to issue
a passport to one Ludwig Henckel, who was born in the United StatesJanuary io, 1874, of a German father, said:
"In issuing him a passport, however, it is proper that the legationshould inform him that it does not guarantee him against any claimwhich may .be asserted to his allegiance or service by the Governmentof Germany while he remains in that country. Having been born ofa German father, conflicting claims with respect thereto may arise,which it is not the purpose of this Government by the issuance of apassport to in anywise prejudice."12
The rule laid down in Attorney General Hoar's opinion of 1869 hadbeen stated in very similar terms by Lord Malmesbury in a despatch ofMarch 13, 1853, to Lord Cowley, in discussing the question of extendingthe protection of the British Government to persons born abroad ofBritish parents and residing in the countries of their birth . 3 Through
an oversight Cogordan, in his book on nationality,s4 spoke of LordMalmesbury's despatch as relating to the status of persons born inGreat Britain of alien parents, and his error has been followed by anumber of writers, including Pradier-Fod6r6.S5 However, if thequestion had been presented to Lord Malmesbury as stated by Cogor-dan, that is, if it had related to the status of a person born in GreatBritain of French parents, fie would no doubt have decided it to thesame effect, namely, that the law of the country having the person
within its jurisdiction must prevail. "In the case of conflicting claims
"to the allegiance of individuals," says Cockburn,
"British statesmen appear to have applied the legal maxim melior estconditio possidentis, and to-have adopted the convenient doctrine that
1 Consular Regulations 1870, 40, 288; 3 Moore, 521.
'For. Rel. 1892, i89; 3 Moore, 533.
'Report of the British Naturalization Commission of 1868, appendix, 67;Cockburn, Nationality (1869) io, rio.
"La nationaliti (2d ed. 189o) 39.
"Droit international public (1887). sec. 1652, note.
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the State -in whose dominions the individual happened to be was entitled
to claim him."
'88
Calvo, who treated -the subject of dual nationality with the greatest
care, seems to have come to the conclusion that the only solution is the
adoption of general international conventions recognizing the principle
just referred to. However, the need of such conventions is doubtful,
since the rule, which is simply. one of necessity, has been generally
recognized without them. Furthermore, this "ame of grab," so to
,speak, is no solution of dual nationality, but merely a modus zivendi.
What, then, is the solution?
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The writer has set forth above the laws of the various countries of
the world relating to nationality by birth and such provisions as they
contain for- election in cases of dual nationality. This review was
made, not for the purpose of informing the reader concerning the laws
of any particular country or countries, but rather for the purpose of
presenting a general view of the various laws and of showing wherein
they resemble one another and wherein they differ. Pradier-Fodr6,
after considering at some length this whole subject, and dismissing the
rule laid down by Lord Malmesbury, under which a person may be
protected as a British subject in one country but not in another, as
leading to "confusion" and "chaos," also discards the "droit d'option,"
or right of election, as practically ineffective, for the reason that this
right is 'generally held to accrue at the age of majority, whereas, in
most countries which have compulsory military service liability there-
for arises before the age of majority is reached.87 He proceeds to
propose rather radical changes in nationality laws generally, by which
the right to the protection of any country would be governed by the
domicil of the individual, rather than his nationality. Under this sys-
tem domicil would in effect override nationality. Other publicists of
note have advocated the same principle. I shall not unde.rtake to discuss
it in the present article further than to express my opinion that, because
of its vagueness and uncertainty, .it would lead to more confusion than
the present clash of nationality laws.8 8 The principal difficulty .in the
provisions of nitionality laws concerning election lies in the fact that
they do not coincide. Consider, for example, the case of a man who
was born in France twenty-three years ago of a British father, is still
domiciled in France and has taken no steps to indicate what nationality
he wishes to elect. Under French law"" he is considered French because
of his having been born in France and domiciled there when he attained
his majority and his having failed to signify an election of British
nationality within the year following; but under British law he is con-
sidered British, because of his father's nationality and his own failure
" Op. cit., at p. io7. 8' Op. cit., at p. 662.
-'8An interesting discussion of domicil and nationality may be found in Bor-
chard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (9,5) 555.
' Civil Code, Art. 8, sec. 4.
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to make a declaration of alienage after attaining majority.9 0 It can
hardly be said that international law furnishes any solution of this case,
because if it is true that international law recognizes election, it recog-
nizes it merely as a principle and not as a definite rule of action.
The solution of the problem of dual nationality advocated by a num-
ber of the leading authorities on international law is simply the adop-
tion by all countries of a single uniform rule for determining native
citizenship, such rule to be based upon the principle of jus sanguinis.
Vattel favored this principle, with a very important qualification.
"By the law of nature," he declared, 91
"children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their
rights; the place of birth produces. no change in this particular, and
cannot, of itself, furnish any reason for taking from a child what naturehas given him; I say 'of -itself,' for civil or political laws may, for parti-
cular reasons, ordain otherwise. But I suppose that the father has
not entirely quitted his country in order to settle elsewhere. If he hasfixed his abode in a foreign country, he is become a member of another
society, at least as a perpetual inhabitant; and his children "will be mem-
bers of it also."
Especial attention is called to the qualification contained in the last
two sentences. quoted, which involve an important concession to the
principle of jus soli.
It is natural that Bar 2 and Pradier-Fod6r6g0 should favor the deter-
mination of nationality by the single principle of jus sanguinis, but it
is somewhat surprising to find that such English writers as Hall 4 and
Cockburn? 5 also recommend the universal adoption of jus sanguinis,
although the latter recommends the same exception which Vattel long
ago suggested. It is to be noted that the authors just mentioned all
belong to European countries, which are not confronted with the pro-
blem of a very large alien population, constantly augmented by immi-
gration. This problem is peculiar to the United States and other
countries of the Western World. They deem it to be to their interest
to make citizens out of the strangers within their gates as soon as they
can be assimilated, and it is believed that they will hesitate a long. time
before adopting a system which will result in doubling, and more than
doubling, their alien population. They will doubtless persist in belief'ing
that they can keep a better hold upon the millions of children of aliens
born within their territories by continuing to recognize them as citizens
from birth. The principle of jus soli which sprang from the. feudal
system of the old world has found- in the new world a new and very real
reason for existing. There seems to be no likelihood, then, that
.countries of this hemisphere will be 'Willing to adopt the principle of
"British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, secs. I, 14.
"Vattel, Law of Nations (1758) Book i, ch. 29, sec. 215.
' Bar, op. cit. note 61, at p. 5o. Op. cit. note 85, at sec. 1652.
"Op. cit. note 63, at p. 228.
"Op. cit. note 83, at p. 188 ff. See also Minority Report of the British Natur-
alization Commission of 1868.
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jus sanguinis unconditionally and discard the principle of jus soli;
although it is perhaps possible that they might be willing to adopt
Vattel's rule, which is really a compromise (perhaps the only possible
compromise) between the two principles. Theoretically it would seem
very desirable, since it embodies the best elements of both principles,
and would result iii preventing altogether the existence of dual nation-
ality. It would grant citizenship to the children of domiciled aliens,
but not to those of alien sojourners.9 6 Such a rule ought to satisfy the
needs of the countries of the western hemisphere as well as the needs
of other countries. There is no reason, in principle, for granting citi-
zenship to children born in the territory of a country to mere sojourners
therein. However, there are two difficulties in the way of adopting
Vattel's rule in the United States. The first is that domicil is in many
cases not easily determined, and the second is that the principle of
jus soli is embedded in the Constitution of the United States, and no
compromise rule of nationality could be adopted without amending the
14th Amendment. The first difficulty is not believed to be insuperable,
since, for purposes of nationality, an arbitrary rule might be adopted
for determining domicil, as for example that actual residence in a
country would raise a presumption of domicil and that a continuance
of such residence for a certain period, say ten years, would confirm such
presumption. As proof that Vattel's rule is not impracticable, it may
be remarked that it is already to be found in varying forms in the laws
of Columbia, Nicaragua, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland,
and Bulgaria. The second objection, would seem to be more serious,
because of the practical difficulty of amending the Constitution, in the
absence of a large organized body of persons desiring it.
Writers on international law who have given the subject of dual
nationality careful study agree, for obvious reasons, that the universal
adoption of a rule of nationality which would prevent altogether the
possibility of dual allegiance would be preferable to the adoption of
a uniform rule of election, for dual nationality even during the years
of minority is an anomaly and results in complications and uncertainty
which should be avoided if possible 7 However, if it is found impos-
sible to effect some such compromise as that suggested by Vattel an
effort should be made -to have a uniform rule of election adopted.
""It is obvious that Vattel's rule in effect makes native citizenship depend
neither upon descent nor place of birth, but upon the parental domicil."
' The Institute of International Law, in a meeting at Venice, on September 29,
1896, adopted certain Resolutions concerning citizenship, of which Article 3 reads
in part astfollows:
"Art. 3. L'enfant n6 sur le .territoire dun itat, d'un pare itranger qui lui-
m&me y est n6, est rev~tu de la nationaliti de cet itat, pourvu que dans l'intervalle
des deux naissances, la famille & laquelle il appartient y est eu son principal
etablissement, et A moins que, dans l'annde de sa majorit6, telle qu'elle est fixde
par la loi nationale de son pare dt par la loi du territoire ou il est n6, il n'est opt6
pour la nationaliti de son pre."
This proposed rule, which is partly modeled after Article 8 of the French law
of June 26, i88g, might be found satisfactory to countries of emigration, bfit it
would not be satisfactory to countries of immigration.
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Such a rule could be adopted only by international conventions, supple-mented by uniform legislation in the several countries. It will perhaps
not be easy to devise a rule which would be acceptable to all countries,but it does not seem to be beyond the range of possibility. The British
rule, which allows persons born in England of alien parents, as well asthose born abroad of British parents, to renounce British nationality
upon attaining majority seems liberal enough, but it has the disadvan-tage of making the election depend entirely upon a bare declaration,
without any reference to the actual or intended domicil of the declarant.As a general principle, it seems desirable to have election determinedby facts, rather than by mere words, or, to be more specific, to have itdetermined by the domicil of the person concerned at the time whenhe reaches majority. A special provision would have to be made to
cover the cases of persons who, at the time of attaining majority, aredomiciled neither in the country of their birth nor in that of their par-ents' nationality. As we have seen, the principle of having dual nation-
ality solved by domicil is already recognized in the laws of France and
several other European countries, as well as in the laws of a number ofLatin American countries. The French law allows persons born inFrance of alien parents and domiciled there at the time of attaining
majority, to renounce French nationality within a year thereafter.It does not seem to the writer desirable to permit such renunciation
unless coupled with removal from the territory. In time of actual orthreatened war it would certainly be undesirable for persons of alienparentage to escape military and other obligations of citizenship by. amere declaration of alienage while remaining in the territory.9  The
adoption of the proposed rule would not mean replacing nationalityby domicil; it'would merely mean having nationality, in cases of dual
nationality, determined by domicil at a certain time, that is, at the time
when the person concerned reaches his majority. It would mean lettinghis own actions speak for him and terminate the unsatisfactory state
of dual nationality. For this purpose it would be quite possible to
adopt the age of eighteen as the age of majority. Also it might benecessary to prescribe an arbitrary rule for determining domicil. Per-haps in a few cases hardship would be caused by the application of theproposed rule, but in most cases, it is believed, it would result in placing
the obligations of citizenship where they justly belong.The general adoption of the above, or some other, uniform rule of
election would certainly be better than allowing the present conflicts
of law to continue, but the more one considers the whole question, the
more he becomes convinced that the only true solution of the questionis the adoption of a uniform rule of nationality. There is no, apparent
reason why Vattel's rule should not be acceptable to countries of emi-
* During the recent war the government of the United States declined torecognize the validity of the election of foreign nationality by persons born inthe United States of alien parents and still domiciled in this country.
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gration and countrids of immigration alike. Generally speaking, the
actual, as well as the legal, domicil of children is governed by that of
their parents, and their national sympathies and aspirations :usually
follow those of their parents. Therefore it is of no practical advantage
to, a country to claim the children of their nationals who have established
themselves permanently in foreign countries. On the other hand, it is
of little, if any, practical advantage to a country to claim the nationality
of child~ren born in its territory of aliens temporarily sojourning therein.
The adoption of Vattel's rule by the United Stafes, through an amend-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, would not
involve a very iadical change in our law of citizenship.99
Until a solution of the problem of dual nationality shall have been
reached through an international agreement, this government will no
doubt continue to observe aid apply, according to its best judgment,
the principle of election, which has been established by many prece-
dents; for, as we have seen, the Secretary of State, in the extension
of protection abroad, has a wide discretion, and is obliged to take into
consideration not only the strict provisions of municipal law, but what,
with due regard .to the clhims of the foreign country as well as those of
this country and the individual in question, appear to be the true equities
in each case Which arises.1 00
"Since writing the above, I have-read a discussion of this question by Geouffre
De Lapradelle, in his NationalWt& d'origine, under the headings, "Domicile
Paternal" (p. 94-io5), and "Hypothese d'une Loi Unique" (p. 388-419). He
concludes first, that a single, uniform law of nationality is necessary, to prevent
the present conflicts, and second, that such law should be based upon jus san-
guini.s, However, for reasons mentiohed above, it is entirely out of the question
for countries of the Western Hemisphere to adopt the principle of jus sanguinis
alone. In a review of Prentiss Webster's book on Citizenship, contributed by
Professor Munroe Smith to the Political Science Quarterly in 1911, mentioned
by De Lapradelle, I find the following expression of opinion, which seems to
agree with my own conclusions. With reference to the development of the
French law, Professor Smith says:
"The reaction which began in the laws'of February 12, i851, and December 16,
1874, has culminated in the law of June 26, 1889, which practically eftablishes the
principle of the family domicile. This principle had already been incorporated
in the Italian and Dutch laws; and it is probably here rather, than in the pure
jus sanguinis that we have the germ of the general law of the future" (6 PoL.
Scr. QUAR. 737).
" For a discussion of the attempts which have been made to settle questions
of dual nationality by separate treaties, between interested countries, see
Borchard, op. cit., 59o, 59I. The provision proposed for insertion in the natural-
ization treaty between the United States and Costa Rica, quoted by Mr. Borchard,
was good, except in so far as it-allowed a person born in either country of
citizens of the other to renounce allegiance to the country of birth, after attain-
ing majority, although remaining domiciled therein. As actions, rather than
mere declarations, should decide questions of domicile (see opinion of Wash-
ington, J. in The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253, 281), so also they should, as far as pos-
sible, determine election of nationality. It is wrong in principle for a person
to be allowed to renounce permanent allegiance to the country of his birth
while continuing to reside there indefinitely. Nationality and allegiance should
be grounded upon realities and not supported by mere technicalities.
